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FOREWORD
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief
of Naval Personnel in 1948. It contains lectures and articles of
professional interest to officers of the naval service.
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are
those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Navy
Department or of the Naval War College.
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THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE MERCHANT MARINE
TO
NATIONAL POWER
A lecture delivered by
Commander George D. Synon, U. S. C. G.

at the Naval War College
September 12, 1949

In considering the relation of the Merchant Marine to na
tional power, it is perhaps automatic for members of the Armed
Forces to regard a large fleet of commercial shipping as indis
pensible to the security of the United States. This premise has
been fundamental to American naval strategy ever since Mahan
enunciated his concept of sea power toward the end of the last
century. It is today a proposition that is widely supported by
many outstanding figures who write and speak publicly on this
subject.
Here, at the War College, however, we must not fall into
the error of accepting any dogma or doctrine simply because it
has been demonstrated in the past to be sound or well-conceived.
It is necessary, rather, constantly to re-appraise in the light of
changing world conditions any and all of the strategic premises upon
which our thinking may tend to become fixed.
Especially is this so in the case of the Merchant Marine.
In the United States, private industry has been unable to operate
ocean shipping on any wide scale without financial assistance from
the Government. We call this subsidy; and we justify the payment
of subsidy on the ground that the Merchant Marine is essential to
economic prosperity and for the national defense. Consequently,
the support of a large fleet of commercial shipping has come to be
Commander Synon is a member of the Naval War College Staff.
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accepted in the United States as a proper function of government.
This viewpoint is vigorously and sincerely supported by the great
majority of individuals and organizations connected with the mari
time industry. But there are many people who believe that an ex
panded Merchant Marine may be contrary to the best interests of
the United States at the present time. These · persons are, of
course, in the minority, but their arguments deserve careful scrut
iny at an institution such as the War College. One ·of the pur
poses of this discussion is to present that contrary point of
view. Many of you officers here may at some time in the future
be called upon to make decisions touching on the Merchant Marine.
You will be helped in arriving at these decisions by a knowledge
not only of the many good arguments both for and against a
strong U. S. Merchant Marine, but also by those which may be

frankly designed to influence public opinion.

As an example of what I am talking about, let me recall to
your mind the state of the American Merchant Marine prior to

World War I and II. At the beginning of the first World War,
we had very little ocean shipping. Other nations carried the major
part of our foreign commerce. When we finally got into that War,

we simply did not have the ships we needed. Our troops and the
vast bulk of our munitions had to be transported overseas in the
ships of our allies. In World War II, we were in somewhat better
shape-particularly as to shipbuilding-but from the standpoint of
available tonnage, we were as poorly prepared to wage global war
in 1941 as we were in 1917.

The backers of a strong Merchant Marine policy point to
these two instances of unpreparedness as over-riding reason for us
to support an expanded fleet of merchant shipping in the future.

And yet, a pretty good case can be made out for the prop
osition that if the United States had been supporting such a mer
chant fleet, the Allies would probably have lost World War I and

2
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could not have won World War IL I shall attempt to do so a little

later in this discussion.

In the meantime, however, let us take a brief glance at
national power in its broadest sense, and determine, if we can, how

merchant shipping, as a part of sea power, has contributed to the
national greatness and prosperity of maritime states in the past.
Against such a background, I shall attempt to relate merchant

shipping to certain aspects of military strategy as it has historically
been employed in the case of Great Britain, since that nation dis
plays so many features that are strategically similar to our own.
Then, turning. to the present, we may consider a number of factors
brought about as a result of World War II which, in my opinion,
require a revision in our traditional concept-to some degree of sea
power-but more precisely, of the function of the Merchant Marine.
These factors are intimately related to the economics of world trade,
without some knowledge of which it is difficult to understand the
shipping situation as it exists today. And finally, a few conclusions,
which may be justified by prevailing world conditions and our
strategic needs for the future.
Character of National Power
The nations of the world have been broadly classified as con
tinental and maritime powers. Many military historians agree
that the character of a nation from this standpoint dictates the
form of strategy that is best suited to it. The British, for ex
ample, are a maritime people, and they have, with success, pursued
a maritime strategy. The Germans, on the other hand, are a con
tinental power, and their important military successes have been
on land. Mind you, this is not to say that a single nation may
not combine in itself certain elements of both sea and land power.

It is simply that such influences as geography, natural resources,
population, and so forth, serve to direct the interests of a people
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primarily toward the land, or toward the sea. If these forces are
recognized and understood, it is possible, in my opinion, to measure
the dependence of a state upon overseas trade, and thus to de
termine a maritime strategy best suited to preserve or increase
the national power.
If we examine the nations of Europe and Asia and arrange
them according to their historical pattern as continental or mari
time powers, we will observe one significant difference between the

two groups. All of the maritime powers-save Great Britain
seem at some time in their history to have risen to world leader
ship as sea powers, and then to have passed into decline-never to

recover sea power once it has been lost. Whether Great Britain is
now moving toward the fringes of that pattern, it is as yet too
soon to say. But not so the continental powers. The great land
powers-Russia, France, Germany-have lost and have regained

the dominant position in Europe on numerous occasions. Even
during periods of decline, they possess their political significance
-as an example, we have the case of Spain today-as opposed to
the almost complete loss of influence in world affairs suffered by

the small nations that border on the sea-of whom Portugal is
likewise a case in point.

The reason for this political phenomenon is, I believe, that
continental powers retain the essential attributes of territory, ma
terial resources, manpower-which cannot be taken from them

whereas, a truly maritime power can compensate itself for the

lack of these advantages only by remaining strong at sea, and sea
power-for reasons that are not clear-does not renew itself.

It seems fair to say, then, that if the independent nations of

the world who are truly maritime in character are forced away

from the sea-whether by economic competition they cannot meet,
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or by political or military means, their influence in world affairs
and, correspondingly, their capacity to defend their independence,
will be markedly reduced. This is the situation confronting the
smaller maritime powers today.
Merchant Shipping and Maritime Power

Now, what is the connection between merchant shipping and
the rise and fall of maritime states?
The Mediterranean basin is perhaps the most fruitful area
for an investigation of this sort. It is the scene of the emergence
of a succession of maritime powers throughout the span of re
corded history. Morever, the course of warfare in Europe has
been inseparably identified with sea power in the Mediterranean.
Naval strength has been exerted in these narrow waters almost
invariably in either of two forms: in the protection of maritime
commerce or in the employment of naval and merchant ship types
for the support of land armies. It is significant that the changes
in weapons and methods of warfare that have taken place since
many centuries before the birth of Christ have failed to alter the
fundamental strategic factors that determine military success or
failure in this critical area of the world. The advantages of in
terior lines, mobility, and freedom of action that were enjoyed by
the ancient powers who were able to control and use the sea lanes
of the Mediterranean persist until this day.
In 525 B. C., Cambyses, the King of Persia, invaded and
subdued Egypt. Then he looked westward, toward Carthage, and
sent his army overland-across the Libyan Desert-to conquer
Carthage and add that nation to his empire. But the Phoenicians
-blood brothers to the Carthaginians-who controlled the sea,
and whom Cambyses could neither coerce nor intimidate, refused
to help him with their ships. Without a fleet for the support of
5
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his troops, Cambyses could not surmount his supply problem across
North Africa-and his army perished in the desert. Yet, in 1940,
the British, under General Wavell, in one of the most remarkable
military campaigns on record, moved across this same stretch of
North African coast to destroy an Italian army of more than 200,000 men. But the British right flank rested firmly on the free use
qf sea communications for the support of Wavell's tank columns
and tactical air.
Indeed, control of the Mediterranean littoral has traditionally
been achieved and maintained by those· belligerents who have first
made secure their communications by sea. Alexander the Great
recognized as· hopeless any attempt to conquer Egypt until he had
first disposed of the Phoenician navy which lay astride the supply
routes of his land armies. So, as a first step, Alexander, unlike
Cambyses, besieged Tyre, the principal Phoenician city, and re
duced it after a campaign of seven months. But by this operation,
Alexander removed the threat to his rear, and he obtained the cargo
shipping without which he could not move against Egypt. Na
poleon, on the other hand, did not percieve that sea power in the
eastern Mediterranean was indispensable to the success of his armies
on land. In his campaign to gain an eastern empire, Napoleon was
turned back at Acre by an inferior Turkish force supported from
seaward by a small squadron of British ships under Sir Sidney
Smith. During the preceding year, as you will recall, Nelson had
demolished the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile, and Napoleon
was without the means to sustain his communications in the face
of British command of the sea. This engagement marked the
collapse of his dream of an empire in the East. After his defeat
before Acre, Napoleon retired on his base in Egypt-baffled by
his inability to use the sea.
The principal states that have held maritime power in the
Mediterranean are Phoenicia, Carthage, the Greek States, Rome,
6
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Venice, Genoa, and Pisa. These States all have certain character
istics in common. Taken as a whole, they may probably be said to
comprise the identity of true maritime character. And it is well
to bear in mind that we are examining a period of more than 2,500
years. These States were invariably small in geographic extent.
They lacked natural resources and arable land. They bordered
on difficult terrain-mountains and deserts, or else the territory of
unfriendly people!:!. The inhabitants of the maritime States were
traders and craftsmen, rather than farmers or herdsmen. And
these States depended on the importation by sea of foodstuffs and
raw materials they were unable to produce at home. Like all other
true maritime powers, they derived a large part of their national
income from hauling the waterborne commerce of other nations
not inclined toward the sea. But their greatest source of wealth and
power grew out of their colonies, which they all sought to obtain
and exploit.
The earlier maritime powers of the Atlantic share these same
characteristics-Portugal and Holland, for example. Great Brit
ain falls into a somewhat special category, but only because of
her insularity, which underlines both her dependence on the sea
and the natural protection that it affords her. I would exclude
France and Spain from such a grouping, despite their extensive
maritime history, since they are primarily continental in charac
ter. But it is proper to add to the list of early maritime states
our own New England seaboard, as it existed from the beginning
of the Nineteenth Century until the Civil War, as this region ex
hibited so many of the features of maritime character.
As you well know, pre-eminence at sea has been distin
guished by the ownership of both combat and commercial fleets,
but it is well to hold in mind that combat fleets have been sub
ordinate in the order of national power to the commercial fleets
7
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they are designed to complement and to protect. The historian Gib
bon clearly sums up this relationship in writing of Venice at the
time of the Crusades: "Nor did she often forget that if armed gal
leys were the effect and safeguard, merchant vessels were the cause
and supply of her greatness."
The decline of sea powers cannot always be ascribed to any
immediate cause. In the history of nations that have risen to mari
time greatness and have lost it, there are deep and slowly moving
influences which I do not intend to examine here. But in the final
stages of the decay of sea power, there is one clear sign for all to
see: The merchant shipping of a declining sea power disappears
from the seas by reason of enemy action or withers it at home
through loss of profitable trade.
The Military Strategy of Great Britain

Let us now turn to Great Britain as the classic example of
national greatness resulting from sea power. An understanding
of the means Britain has employed to obtain and hold world power
will assist us in applying correctly our own maritime strength in
support of the national policy. It is not necessary to point out to
this audience the similarities between our maritime position and
that of Great Britain. It is, rather, the dissimilarities that must
be emphasized. Among these, the most important is our lack of de
pendence on the outside world for food. Of almost equal importance
is the self-contained nature of our economy. This is not to infer
that we do not draw from other parts of the world raw materials
we do not produce in adequate quantities at home, or that the
revenue we obtain from foreign trade does not form an important
part of our national income. It is simply that our economy is not
geared to a complex machinery of imports, exports, and all their
related maritime enterprises-as is Great Britain's. It has truly
been said that England must export or die. That statement could
8
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not apply to us whatever. And a final difference to be stressed is
that the United States-in addition to being a great sea power
is also a great land power, despite Mahan's thesis that no nation
could be both.
Britain has applied sea power with a skill that surpasses
all the other features of her foreign policy. King George V called
England's Fleet her "sure shield", as indeed it has been. Not since
William the Conqueror has Britain been invaded in war, although
there have been periods when invasion seemed imminent. And,
strange to say, there have always been Britons who feared invasion
at times such as these and have urged the erection of all sorts of
complicated land defenses to meet the enemy when he first stepped
on shore. When Napoleon stood on the Boulogne coast, with an

army of 130,000 men and a great assembly of transport and cargo
craft to ferry it. across the Channel, the Admiralty itself was ap

prehensive the invasion would succeed. But Lord St. Vincent
under whom the immortal Nelson learned his trade-knowing full
well the French would first have to dispose of the English Fleet
that lay in the Channel, reassured the Admiralty in a classic re
mark that seems worth repeating. "I do not say the French can
not come", he said, "I only say they cannot come by sea."
The strategy by which Britain has employed naval strength
to advance and protect the interests of her commercial fleets is
well known. Less widely recognized, perhaps, is somewhat the re

verse of this circumstance: whereby merchant shipping has been
a primary influence in shaping Britain's military strategy. In every
war, as you know, the readiness of a weapon for use exerts a con
trolling influence on the way the war is fought. In this sense,
merchant shipping has served Britain as a weapon.

The British have gained their most notable military suc
cesses when they have been able to employ land armies of relat-

9
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ively small size at critical points where control of the sea ap
proaches could be assured. By this strategy, Britain has been able
to minimize her lack of manpower and bring to bear against con
tinental opponents inconvenient or distracting pressure on flank or

rear, Such a strategy depends, of course, upon allies to engage the
enemy frontally if the war is to be fought to a conclusion. But it
has been the· preferred policy of Britain not to engage in land war
fare against a continental opponent unless assisted by a continental

ally. Merchant ships have provided the means by which this ec
centric form of strategy might be put to use. (And by eccentric, I
mean displaced from the center, rather than queer or odd.) Relat
ively small forces have been landed by transport and cargo shipping
at points remote from the main theater but which the enemy is com
pelled to defend if he is to remain secure all along his line.
This eccentric form of warfare is ideally exemplified by
Wellington's campaign in the Iberian Peninsula. Most of the na
tions of Europe were allied with England against Napoleon, and
the main theater of war was in mid-continent. Wellington used

the Fleet to transport his army to Portugal, where he entered
Europe, in the French rear. His army was relatively small but it
imposed an annoying division of force upon the French. Wellington
could not be ignored since he was stirring up so much trouble

with the Spaniards. The attempt to dislodge him in a series of
limited engagements was unsuccessful; and to have moved against
him in force-which Napoleon would have been compelled to do
meant transferring the main theater of war. In such a case,
Wellington would either have retired behind his prepared posi
tions at Torres Vedras or re-embarked his army into his trans
ports.

Thus Napoleon was confronted with what all continental

soldiers seek to avoid: a war on two fronts. When Wellington felt

that he was strong enough to move toward France, he used the

Fleet to transfer his base by easy stages along the Spanish coast-

10
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line. "If anyone", Wellington said, "wishes to know the history of
this war, I will tell them that it is our maritime superiority gives me
the power of maintaining my army, while the enemy are unable to
do so."
And yet, despite the maritime strategy that has been so well
suited to British arms, there is a perverse streak in British military
character which seeks the land battle of large proportions. Before
the outbreak of the first World War, there was a clear schism in
British military planning. The Admiralty group was all for em
ploying the small British Expeditionary Force in the event of war
in an eccentric move-an amphibious landing along the Pomer
anian coast, in the German rear, or along the Belgian coast, at
Ostend or Zebrtigge, on the flank. By this means, it was con
tended, far more pressure would be taken off the French than if the
British divisions were to take up a position on the left of the main
French line. The opposing group in the War Office favored the em
ployment of Britain's military effort in direct action against the
principal German armies. Sir Henry Wilson, then Director of
Military Operations, and an ardent Francophile, put over his plan
to get the British army of six divisions into alignment with the
French as soon after the outbreak of war as possible.
Now, if the British have a defect in their military make
up, it is their dogged persistence-once they are committed to a
line of action-in following it out to the bitter end. "Maintaining
the objective", they call it. The French recognize this. On one oc
casion, Wilson inquired of General Foch what would be the smallest
number of British troops that would be of any value to France in
the event of a war with Germany. "Send us one British soldier",
Foch replied, "and we shall take pains to see that he is killed !"
The result was, that instead of the modest army of six di
visions with which Britain had thought to assist France, she mobil-
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ized three and a half million men, of whom 700,000 were killed-a
disaster from which she has never recovered.
The Dardanelles campaign was the only operation of major
proportions undertaken by the Allies during World War I in which
this eccentric strategy was employed. Its objective was to turn the
left flank �f the Central Powers by knocking Turkey out of the war,

and thus to obtain access to eastern Europe as a means for sustain
ing Russia.

Notwithstanding its failure and the criticism which

has attended it, the Dardanelles campaign was soundly conceived.

It was a proper and logical use of the mobility afforded by trans

port type shipping to apply land pressure at a critical point the
enemy could not readily defend. This operation failed not so much

because of the brilliant defense put up by the German, Liman von

Sanders, but primarily because the British were unable to support
two offensives at the same time. Reinforcements that might have

turned the tide at Gallipoli were withheld until after the Loos of

fensive on the Western Front.

Can we perceive in all this a lesson for the United States?

Militarily, we possess the insular advantages of Great Britain but

we possess also her corresponding disadvantage of limited man

power in comparison with that of. our most likely continental ad
versary.

It is, of course, no part of my purpose to suggest for us

any basic plan for war, but it seems plain, if Britain is to be

taken as any sort of an example, that we cannot afford the head

long employment of great masses of troops in land warfare against
a continental opponent.

If this be so, and I think it is, then we

must-in the conservation of our national power-turn to an ec

centric-a maritime form of strategy-and exploit the advantages

of mobility, surprise, and economy of force that are conferred by
sea power-at the heart of which is merchant type shipping.

12
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Political and Economic Considerations
It was primary thesis of Admiral Mahan that for a nation
to be a great sea power it must conform to three requirements:
First, such a nation must have the means of production, and thus

be stimulated to the exchange of products. Second, it must have
shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on. And, third, it must
own colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping.
(Incidentally, our own lack of colonies led Mahan to question
whether the United States could ever become truly great at sea.)

Prior to World War II, this concept of sea power was well
supported in the history of maritime nations. You will observe,

however, that it is a concept that grows out of the colonial sys
tem and the doctrine of mercantilism. In the period before World
War I-in which Mahan wrote-the maritime powers were in con

stant struggle for individual advancement, and all of them owned
colonies. Under the system of mercantilism, a nation seeks to ob

tain the materials needed to support its economy from within its
own orbit and to export its production to others at a profit. Hence,
each of the maritime states required its own fleet of merchant

shipping, since none could depend upon its rivals to provide ships
at a time when not to provide them would weaken the relative
position of the other.
Taken on the whole, this theory of sea power was certainly
justified by world conditions prevailing until World War II. But, as

a result of that War, there have been profound changes in the mili
tary and economic workings of world politics which, in my opinion,
cause us to revise our earlier ideas of what is, and what is not, in the

national interest. The rise of international gangsterism and the to
talitarian state has forced peace-loving nations to look toward col
lective action as the best means of preserving their individual se
curity. In World War II, we used lend-lease to support nations

13
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whose interests were tied up with our own. At the present time, we
are endeavoring by means of E. C. A. to restore and sustain the

economic structure of the free nations of Europe. We believe
those nations must enjoy a reasonable degree of prosperity if they
are to be strong enough to withstand penetration by forces or ideol
ogies dangerous to ourselves. In order to do this, we are expending
-and we are committed to expend-a vast portion of our national
substance. Nobody knows what this program ultimately may cost.
But it is a program, nonetheless, around which our entire foreign
policy is centered.
This is a philosophy of world politics to which we as a na

tion have not heretofore subscribed. And it imposes upon us the
necessity to review some of the assumptions wh.ich have been funda
mental to our national thinking in the past. One of these is the as'."

sumption that the ownership of a large merchant marine is a
source of national power. Standing alone, this assumption is good,;
but it fails to take into account other, more potent, factors upon

which the national interest depends. As I see it, the question to be
decided is whether national support of an expanded U. S. merchant
fleet is in agreement with our larger policy of aid to Europe. If
not, then we must find a policy for the Merchant Marine that tends
to advance the program we are embarked upon in Europe at such
great cost arid risk to ourselves.

Since our immediate objectives in Europe are economic, let us

give some attention to the economics of world shipping.

It so happens that most of the nations to whom we are ex'."
tending assistance are maritime powers-Norway, Britain, The
Netherlands, and Greece, for example.

Or else they have large

maritime interests, such as France and Italy. The life of these na.:
tions to great extent depends on the sea. Before World War II, they

14
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shared-if we exclud� Japan---,-the.bulk of the carrying trade of the
world. The. transportation of ocean commerce is one of the prin
cipal services they sell to others. These countries haul freight
cheaply and efficiently. Moreover, they must have the income they
derive from this service if they are to maintain economic stability.
It affords their peoples a means of livelihood and provides them with
foreign exchange to buy the food and materials they cannot produce
at home. Today, the shipyards of Europe are striving to replace the
tonnage lost during the War, although the United States can sup
ply enough shipping for all the world's needs. These nations realize
intuitively they cannot turn their backs on the sea.
With this background, we may return to the proposition ad
vanced earlier in this discussion, namely, that the existence of a
large U.S. Merchant Marine would have jeopardized Allied chances
of winning World Wars I and II.
First, let us recognize that the total demands of world trade
will support a corresponding amount of world shipping. In other
words, the more trade, the more shipping in active employment.
But existing tonnage in excess of these requirements will either be
operated at a loss, or it will remain idle, since there will not be
enough trade to go round. Thus, at any given time, there is a pool
of world shipping that provides the means of ocean transportation
for world commerce. If the principles of economics are allowed to
operate freely, the size of this pool will be determined by the law
of supply and demand.Some nations will hold more of this shipping,
and others will hold less, depending upon their ability to compete in
the various world trades.
This was essentially the system that prevaiied prior to World
War I and II. Foreigners could operate ocean shipping more cheap
ly than we could; consequently, they carried the greater part of our
trade.
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Now, what happens when you tinker with this system?
What would have been the effect if, a few years prior to World War
I or II, we had, by means of subsidy, put an expanded U. S. mer
chant fleet into the pool of world shipping? The result, as you can

very well see, would have been to force certain of the other carrier
nations to cut down their merchant fleets to the level the remaining
trade would accommodate.

It is not hard to see which nations these would have been.
They would have been those nations whose costs of operation most
nearly approached our own-which means Britain, since she has less
of a margin, or cushion, to absorb the pressure of uneconomic com
petition from us. It is, of course, quite true that Britain's world
wide interests would have preserved for her a substantial merchant
fleet-still the largest in the world-but, nevertheless, competition
of the magnitude we are considering here would seriously have cut
into the tonnage that was available to Britain at the outbreak of both
World Wars.

There is good reason to believe the German U-Boat cam
paigns against British shipping in both World War I and II very

nearly succeeded. If the results of the first U-Boat campaign in
World War I be examined-and there were two separate campaigns
in that War-it will be observed that the British barely managed
to survive. With a smaller merchant fleet, there seems no doubt
Britain would have been starved into submission. The United
States was doing its best to remain neutral-not sending its ships
into the war zone, and so forth-but we had ocean freight backed
up on every railroad siding as far west as Chicago. The pressure
was on to do something for the Allies, and to get that freight mov
ing.

A larger U. S. Merchant Marine would have alleviated this

situation, and we would have been able to send our industrial and
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agricultural production throughout the rest of the world. Likewise,

a larger U.S. merchant tonnage would have increased the potential

hazard to Germany if the United States were drawn into the War;

and, with the correspondingly better prospects of success of its

U-Boat campaign against Britain, it seems quite likely the German

High Command would not have initiated the policy of indiscriminate
sinking that finally did bring us into the War.

The situation was very much the same in World War II.

Although Britain had a greater tonnage, she had military commit

ments that required merchant shipping on a far wider scale. Cargo

bottoms were a critical shortage for Britain throughout the War. Ac

cording to the British White Paper of November, 1944, Britain

started World War II with 17,500,000 gross tons of merchant ship
ping under her control. By the end of 1943, she had lost the as

tounding total of nearly twelve million gross tons!
,

It is not necessary for us to dwell on the probable results of

the elimination of Great Britain as an opponent to Germany in either

World War I or II. And I am well aware that the circumstances

which I have outlined and which might have forced her withdrawal
are entirely conjectural. But my point is this-we must not accept
blindly the statement that a large Merchant Marine is for the

United States an unfailing source of national power.

We share with Britain leadership in a world complex of sea

power that rings the continents of Europe and Asia like a girdle.

The members of that complex are mutually supporting. This align
ment of maritime strength provides individual states in the mari

time community with what is probably their most valuable single

means to withstand domination by land power. A proper policy for
the Merchant Marine will tend to preserve this alignment upon

which the maritime position of the United States ultimately depends.

17
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How can we go about doing this?
First, I should say we must estimate, as best we can, what
will be our requirements for merchant type shipping in the event of
war-not only for ourselves, but also for our prospective allies.
Then we must determine how these requirements may be satis
fied without adversely affecting our other vital interests not direct
ly related to shipping.
Allied needs for merchant shipping in time of war arrange
themselves naturally into two categories: the short-term needs
and the long-term needs. The pool of world shipping is one of the
principal sources from which this tonnage may be obtained-just
as it was in the last War and the War before that. Merchant ships
lose much of their nationality in time of war. Officers here can re
call convoys in the last War in which the flags of half a dozen
Allied nations were flown. In World War II, the merchant tonnage
available to all the Allies was drawn upon as a common fund
centrally disposed of and centrally directed. We may expect some
such procedure to be adopted in any future war.
If we define our short-term needs as those during the first
six months of a war, it will be safe to say they can be adequately
provided for from three already existing sources: (1) the tonnage
controlled by our prospective allies and friendly neutrals, (2) the re
serve fleets, which we must keep up-to-date and in good order, and
(3) the active U. S. Merchant Marine.
I will not touch further on the first two of these sources.
Nor will I discuss the merchant type tonnage available in the Mili
tary Sea Transport Service. But, as to the third of these sources of
short-term shipping, it is my opinion that we can maintain under
our Flag a fleet of merchant shipping which will take its proper place
in the world complex of maritime power-without weakening any
18
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of its members-and still give us a good nucleus for expansion in
time of war.

Briefly stated, such a fleet may be built around three pri
mary peacetime demands for shipping in the United States :

(1) Domestic shipping. Coastal and intercoastal shipping is flat on
its back. It has never returned to the level of activity it en
joyed prior to World Wars I and II. It must be restored if our
maritime potential is to be maintained. I would urge the extension
of subsidy or some other form of government assistance to this
type of shipping if for no other reason than it is an invaluable
source of seamen and of the miscellaneous smaller auxiliary craft
always so badly needed upon the outbreak of war. (2) The tonnage
we must operate on certain ocean routes to guarantee a continuing
supply of materials we do not produce at home-manganese, bauxite,
tin, and other minerals,-coffee and sugar, if you like. (3) The
tanker fleet. This, gentlemen, would be a considerable merchant
marine. It would by no means put us out of the shipping business,
and it would avoid cutting into the economic substance of our friends
in Europe.

Our long-term requirements for merchant type shipping are
more difficult to estimate. They will of course, be dictated by the
nature of the war on the military front and by the rate and de

gree of mobilization of all our other resources. Thus, it is clear we
will be granted time-within limits-to produce the additional ship
ping we may need, as our economy and manpower are more widely
mobilized. No one can say with certainty what our shipping re
quirements will be in the event of a long war, just as no one can
say where we shall be compelled to hold and where we may be able

to go forward, but it is prudent to assume that military operations

widely separated on the continents of Europe and Asia will have

to be supported, as will our own civilian economy and the civilian
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populations of certain of our allies. This bloc of shipping may sur
pass in tonnage all the Allied shipping of World War II.
But whatever these requirements may be, it must be em
phasized that we cannot hope to satisfy them unless we preserve
the shipbuilding industry in the United States. The know-how of
building ships is indispensable to sea power. It is at once an art

and a science, acquired patiently and painstakingly by those who
practice it. A competent force of designers and technicians upon
whom the industry may expand must be maintained in peace, if
the demands of war are to be met. In my opinion, a peacetime

Merchant Marine of the order I have described-coupled with our
naval building, the maintenance of the reserve fleets, and certainly
a program of "prototype-ship" construction-will provide us with
such a force and serve to keep the shipbuilding industry in a
healthy condition.

Gentlemen, I have by no means given you the entire picture
of the Merchant Marine. The Department of Logistics will under

take a detailed study of many aspects of this subject I have simply
touched upon; and Strategy & Tactics students will be afforded a
resume' of that study later in the year.
What I have tried to do here today is simply to give you
an insight into the relation between merchant shipping and national
power as it has existed in the past, and to provide, if possible, some

basis of policy for the treatment of other, smaller, maritime powers
upon whose continued well-being our own best interests depend.
With much of what I have said, you may not agree. In
deed, I should expect you to question critically many of the argu
ments I have put forward. But, as you spend more time here at the
War College, you will find-as I have-that one of its chief ob
jectives is

to encourage you

to think things out for yourself.

That is also the purpose of these remarks.
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BASIC ELEMENTS OF NAVAL LOGISTICS
A lecture delivered by

Captain H. E. Eccles, U. S. N.
at the Naval War College
September 8, 1949

Napoleon's Russian campaign is the classic example of mili

tary disaster caused by the failure properly to estimate the logis

tic situation. Two striking examples of military defeat caused by a

breakdown or interruption of logistic support are found in the fall

of the Confederacy and in Rommel's North African campaign.

In World War II we have recently seen two examples of suc

cess built on the foundation of a vast trans-oceanic logistic system,

Eisenhower's European campaign and the war in the Pacific.

In

each case unremitting pressure was made possible by a successful

logistic support system. Many more examples can be cited to show
the place of logistics in warfare, but none should be necessary.

For the last hundred and fifty years there has been a steady

increase in fire power of all combat units. This, of course, requires

an increase in the amount of logistic support required to maintain

one combat soldier or sailor in the war zone. The present acceleration

of this trend emphasizes the continuing need for a greater logistic

efficiency and better understanding of the problem. There are two
ways in which a logistic support system can break down: one, of

course, is by enemy action, and the other is by its own inefficiency.

Regardless of the cause of such breakdown, the result is always the

same; it· is always a marked decrease in combat effectiveness.

This discussion is not concerned with the strategy and tac..

tic� required to cut an enemy's lines of transport and supply. Rather

it is concerned with a discussion of logistic efficiency. In World War
Captain Eccles is a member of the Naval War College Staff.
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II, in spite of much waste and inefficiency, our logistic support sys

tems worked. This, however, should not lead us to assume that a sim

ilar method will be satisfactory in a future war.

The basic situation under which we will fight will probably be

entirely different: we shall have to fight in an economy of relative

scarcity as opposed to the economy of plenty in which we fought
most of World War II. In case of another war the United States

will have to be prepared to undertake extensive overseas opera
tions immediately upon the outbreak of war. We will not have the

time to build up behind the screen of a so called "phoney war" and

strong allies before we become actively engaged in combat. Also it
is quite likely that the industrial plant of the continental United
States will be physically damaged by enemy action. The extent of

this damage is, of course, impossible to predict but extensive damage

can easily be caused by long-range air bombardment, guided missiles

launched from enemy submarines, or sabotage. Finally, the improve

ments in modern submarines pose an increasing threat to our lines
of communications to our overseas forces and may have a serious
effect on our imports of strategic raw materials. Because of. these

conditions we must search out every means of increasing our
logistic efficiency.

As we look at the history of various engineering develop

ments we find that in each instance major advances in efficiency have

been based upon an increased knowledge of theory and principle. In

1903 Wilbur and Orville Wright, while they knew very little about

the theory and principle of aerodynamics, were able to build an air

plane that flew. However, the progress from 1903 to 1949 in both
the internal combustion engine and the airplane itself have both

been based primarily on an increased knowledge of the theories and

principles of engineering and aerodynamics. And so it behooves us

to seek an understanding of logistic theory and principle in order

that we may improve our logistic efficiency.
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First comes the question of the definition of Logistics. Just

what is Logistics? There are many definitions, some of them quite

long and detailed. For example, there is the definition given by
Doctor Duncan S., Ballantine in his book, "U. S. Naval Logistics

in the Second World War'':

"In its broadest definition the term logistics signifies
the total process by which the resources of a nation-ma
terial and human-are mobilized and directed toward the
accomplishment of military ends. Officially naval logis
tics has been defined as 'the supply of material and per
sonnel, including the procurement, storage, distribution
and transportation of material, and the procurement,
housing, training, distribution and transportation of per
sonnel together with the rendering of services to Naval
operating forces'."
The JCS definition currently effective is:
"That part of the entire military activity which deals
with production, procurement, storage, transportation,
distribution, maintenance and evacuation of personnel,
supplies and equipment; with induction, classification, as
signment, welfare and separation of personnel; and with
facilities required for the support of the military establish
ment including construction and operation thereof. It com
prises both planning and implementation."
In my opinion neither of these definitions is wholly satis

factory for our purpose of developing theory and principle, and

therefore I offer instead a very broad general definition which has
been derived from Colonel Thorpe's excellent little book "Pure
Logistics", published in 1917:

"Strategy and Tactics provide the scheme for the conduct
of military operations; Logistics provides the means there
for."
In amplification of this we may consider that the means
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for the conduct of military operations are MEN, MATERIALS
and SERVICES.

Within the framework of this broad definition all the other
more exact and precise definitions can be included. Furthermore,
this broad, simple definition has the great advantage of relat
ing Strategy,Tactics and Logistics.
In order to understand the importance of this relationship

let me digress a moment. In the study of war we are interested in
reality rather than in mere words; and, while words are necessary
for us to formulate and exchange ideas, yet we must never feel that
words in themselves have any reality. They are merely symbols and

regardless of what symbols we use to express our formulation of
this complex reality that we call war, the words themselves are
merely the symbols or the means of conveying these ideas. In

dealing with a reality which is as complex as modern war it is
understandable that what any particular individual sees will de

pend very largely on his point of view. That is not a new thing

because all through human life various people will look at the same

thing and yet will give a different interpretation of the reality that

they see in that object. In some instances the differences resulting

from differences in point of view will be very marked; in other
cases they may be minor, but differences always exist. F,or ex

ample, if we consider medicine and anatomy, doctors look at the

human being in different ways depending on their specialty. If, for

example, we ask in succession a nerve specialist, an orthopedist, or
an eye, ear, nose and throat specialist to discuss human nahtre,

behavior and weakness, we will find that quite likely there will be
three different points of view expressed. In medicine we have the

advantage of many years of study in the development of a precise,

scientific terminology, but even then the discussions of the same

thing will vary as these three· specialists focus their attention on
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different aspects of the same reality. We can easily realize that
their difference fa point of view in no way affects the reality of
human nature and behavior.
And so as we look at war we each of us may see it in a
different perspective. The strategist, the geopolitician, the logis
tician and the economist will all tend to emphasize different but
related aspects. In war we do not have a precise and exact scientific
language with which to express our ideas. In war we are dealing
with many intangibles, intangibles of the human mind and the
human spirit, and we are not in a position where we can make
precise and controlled scientific experiments to further our
knowledge of war. Therefore, we must expect that our four differ
ent points of view will produce four very different discussions of war.
As we study war we find more and more that it is neces
sary to develop broad and comprehensive understanding. Breadth of
understanding implies understanding of the other man's point of
view. The fact that we may have very different points of
view in our discussions of war does not in any sense imply that
war itself is different or that the difference in the way two in
dividuals express their concepts of war indicate that one is wholly
correct and the other incorrect.
A useful illustration of how logistics, economics and war are
related is found in a sentence from a recent Munitions Board
presentation:
"The logistic process is at one and the same time the
military element in the nation's economy and the economic
element in its military operations."
The understanding of any complex entity or subject re
quires a study of its structure. I consider that Logistics has a
definite structure, that a knowledge of this structure is essential
to a knowledge of the nature of Logistics and its relationship to
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war, and I believe that substantial agreement as to . this structure

will be required before we can go very far in developing sound
theories and principles of Logistics. So I offer the following formula
tion of structure for your consideration and criticism. Logistics is
composed of fundamental elements and basic aspects. I consider
that the fundamental elements are: The Determination of Require
ments, Procurement and Distribution; the Basic Aspects are Organi

tion, Planning, Execution and Supervision. No matter what our task .
may be in Logistics we will find these elements and aspects, and
these elements and aspects blend and overlap in a manner which
varies greatly according to circumstances. Every logistic problem

starts with the determination of requirements; the next step is
the procurement of these requirements; the final step is their dis
tribution. No matter what element we are dealing with we must
organize, plan, execute and supervise.

Taking up our basic elements let us first consider require
ments. The determination of requirements is considered to be part
of "consumer logistics", and as such is under military control. There
are many factors in the determination of requirements, but the
most important in my opinion are six in number. In the first place,
all logistic requirements to be realistic must stem from specific
strategical and tactical plans. The questions are: What combat
forces must we provide for? Where are they going to be operating?

When are they going to be operating? And in what manner are
they going to operate? The civilian economy is very important

because our entire military machine is based on a sound civilian
economy. If we permit this civilian economy to disintegrate, ulti
mately this disintegration will spread with disastrous effects upon

the combat forces. Therefore, in determining our national require

ments we must be sure to provide for all the human and material

needs of our civilian economy. This, of course, makes major addi

tions to the demands upon our overseas shipping for the importation
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of strategic materials. At the same time we must never forget that
we have allies who must be supported, and that there are benevolent
neutrals whose benevolence it pays us to insure by continued sup
port to their economies. We should never forget that the military
government of the occupied areas makes further imperative logis
tic demands and we must provide for them. In World War II we
did not fully understand the necessity for this ; for instance, in 1943
during the Italian Campaign the American Army operating in Italy
was deprived of certain shipments of ammunition because the am
munition that had been scheduled to sail was cancelled in order to
provide room for wheat for the civilian population of Italy. In the
latter part of the war we overcame this deficiency and planned
for our military government needs, but it was most embarrassing to
the combat forces to find that ammunition had to yield to civilian
food.
In all estimates of requirements we must ascertain the state
of our resources in pernonnel, material, weapons and facilities,
and correlate our data to arrive at the final estimates.
It is only when we have made this complete determination
of requirements
and compared it with the state of our resources
.
.
that we are in a position to determine the manner in which logistic
considerations may limit our strategical and tactical plans.
Next in the· field of fundamental elements is the question
of procurement. This comes under the heading of "producer logis
tics" and is generally under civilian control. Military procurement
is based primarily on industrial mobilization, which is the orderly
coordinated mobilization of all material and human resources of the
nation for the most effective conduct of war. It requires expansion
and establishment of production facilities, major conversion of pro
duction facilities, a very high degree of planning, and the formula-
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tion and issuance of preliminary educational contracts which ex
tend into actual trial production. Furthermore, industrial mobiliza
tion must always include consideration of the mobilization and al
location of manpower to industry. The Industrial College of the
Armed Forces is a splendid institution which is primarily concerned
with the study of industrial mobilization. In all matters of pro
curement we must at all times be fully conscious of the implica
tions of lead time. Lead time may be defined as "the interval be
tween the time of the decision to provide an item to the combat
forces and the time such an item is delivered to these forces in
adequate quantity and in reliable operating condition for use against
the enemy." The reliable operating condition means that there is an
adequate supply of trained personnel both for operation and main
tenance. This question of lead time enters into almost every logis
tic problem that can arise in war, and its understanding is a
matter of the most urgent importance to all officers. Lead time
may vary from a few hours in the case of certain reserve ma
terials which are in ready supply in the combat areas, to five or
ten years for new types of ships or planes or other complex equip
ment.
The provision of reliable operating and maintenance per
sonnel and spare parts is a very important factor in lead time. For
example, in 1945 the Navy undergoing Kamikaze attacks off Oki
nawa was very much interested in obtaining airborne early warning
radar. The Navy Department had developed and tested an airborne
early warning system and yet the department refused to send it to
the forward areas. That decision was perfectly correct because
had this system been sent forward it would have been no real pro
tection; rather it would have been a delusion or false protection,
because at that time we did not have the personnel or know how
to maintain it in reliable operating condition.
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There is a further but narrower definition of lead time which
is also important, and in this meaning it indicates the length of time
necessary to package, ship and deliver to the combat forces ma
terials which are in ready supply in the zone of the interior.
We come next to the element of distribution. Distribution
is part of "consumer logistics" and it is primarily under military
control. Distribution picks up where procurement leaves off and in
this pick up there is a very high degree of overlap. Distribution
normally extends from the depots and warehouses in the con
tinental United States thoughout the entire combat area up to the
point where the bullet is placed in the gun or the beans in the mess
kit of the ultimate consumer.
Transportation and distribution are almost synonomous. In
this connection it is always well to remember that transportation
must be responsive to the needs of the combat command. Again,
lead time is important. The narrower definition of lead time given
previously applies primarily to distribution.
Having discussed very briefly the fundamental elements we
will now take a look at the basic aspects. First, as to organization
logistic organizations are large, complex and in many instances
controversial. It is interesting to note that many of the con
troversies that existed in the Army in the period in which the gen
eral staff was developing had their roots in the logistic problems.
Many of the arguments that are now taking place in Washington
within and among the three services stem from logistic causes.
In actual size our logistic organizations are much larger than
our combat organizations, and therefore no discussion of logistics
can in any way be complete without consideration of organization.
Organization is not a dead or static thing. Organization is a living
thing, and as such it must be constantly re-examined and revised
29
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as circumstances dictate.

In spite of the tremendous variety of
good organizations that exist there is usually found in any good

organization an adherence to sound and well understood principles.

If we are to depart from these principles (and such departure is

frequently warranted), we should do it with an awareness that we
are violating a principle rather than do it out of ignorance. Every

time you violate a principle of organization you pay a price; some

times the payment of that price is worthwhile, but not always.

The commander of any force is always responsible for the

organization of his force and our commanders should be constant

ly aware of the urgent necessity for maintaining our peacetime or

ganizations in such form that there can be a swift transition from

peace to war without changing the essential structure of the organi

zation.

Peacetime logistics are relatively simple; in war they are

very complex.

If for the sake of immediate economy we allow our

peacetime organizations

to

take a form which is unsuited for war,

when war comes, the commander himself will have to revise that

organization, and such revision will greatly intrude on the time

that he would greatly prefer to devote to strategic and tactical
problems of the most urgent nature.

When we consider the question of logistic planning we must

recognize the fundamental principle that strategic and logistical
planning are inseparable. No logistic plan has any value unless it is

based on the specific strategic plan, and no strategic plan has any
value unless it can be logistically supported.

The always present factor of lead time makes concurrent

planning mandatory.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are now so im

pressed with the necessity for this concurrent strategic and logis

tical planning that in their forthcoming "Joint Action Armed

Forces" they propose to say that strategic and logistical planning

must be concurrent and must precede tactical planning.
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The :final aspects are execution and supervision. Actually,
it is hard to make an accurate distinction between these two, and
therefore they will be considered together. It is well to remember
that a good plan, well executed, is better than a perfect plan poorly
executed. Therefore, we should not seek too much perfection in our
plans, but should sometimes be prepared to say "Let well enough
alone" and proceed with the execution in spite of known imper
fections. In this connection let us remember the fact that a
logistic plan in wartime acquires great actual physical momentum.
A major operation requires the movement of hundreds of
thousands of tons of material extending over many months and over
many thousands of miles of land and sea. While it may be possi

ble with good and flexible planning to change the direction or
somewhat modify the timing of an offensive operation, it is very
difficult to reverse its flow.

Perfection in planning can never be a substitute for imagina

tion, initiative, judgment and determination in the execution of
the plan.
Continued progress in planning and in the execution of plans

will depend upon the analysis of results. In other words, logistic
operations require the same careful analysis and supervision of the

planned action as do purely combat operations.

Let us pass from the broad general view of Logistics to
consideration of Navy Logistics. You are all familiar with the

present organization of the Navy. It is excellently portrayed in the
pamphlet "The United States Navy", published by the executive

office of the Secretary in 1948.

If we examine the description and

discussion therein we :find that through the Civilian Secretaries

and the Bureau system there is a high degree of civilian control of

"Producer Logistics". And we :find that through the Chief of Naval
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Operations, the Frontier, District and Fleet Commanders there is

military control of "Consumer Logistics".

All Naval planning stems from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

the Chief of Naval Operations and is in three general groups.
first stage plans consist of statements of. missions and tasks.

The

The

second stage plans consist of the Basic Naval Establishment Plan,

the Basic Mobilization Plans, the Basic Logistic Plan and the
Strategic and Logistic Code plans.

Finally, the third stage plans

consist of the Supporting and Subsidiary Plans stemming from the

Code Plans and the amplifying detailed plans prepared by the Com

manders afloat and ashore who actually execute the plans.

This excellent planning method which evolved out of the

experience of World War II provides a flexible, decentralized sys

tem which is in harmony with sound principles of organization and

command.

Thus, we have a sound National Defense Organization and a

sound Naval Organization and Planning system as a basic structure

through which Strategy, Logistics and Tactics can be harmoniously
related.

There remains the ever vital task of educating our offi�

cers to understand and use the system .

This sound basic support planning system is put into actual

execution through four related types of Naval operating organiza
tions.

These are: The Continental Shore Establishment, The Ad

vanced Shore Bases, The Floating Bases and The Mobile Logistic
Support Forces and Groups.

It is through these organizations

that

the Naval Supply System distributes to the fleet the myriad of ma
terial supplies that are the lifeblood of our seagoing forces.

It

is

through these organizations that the services and men are chan

neled to the fleet. These organizations are linked and fed by trans
portation systems both sea and air. And again for emphasis let me
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remind you that transportation must be responsive to the needs of
combat command.

A successful offensive requires and acquires momentum. Suc
cessful war is not a one-two punch, but rather a long succession
of punches and the closer one punch follows the previous one the
more the enemy is kept off balance, the less the losses of the at
tacker and the greater the losses of the defender. This timing is
vital and is determined primarily by logistic considerations.
It is obvious that all fighting power ultimately rests upon
logistic support which is derived from the land. Thus, while we

recognize that ships are dependent upon the land, we must never
forget that the fighting ship, more than any other military weapon,
has within itself inherent mobility and a capacity for self
sustenance. Hence, many combat operations can be conducted with
the initial load of supplies that the ships themselves carry. How
ever, sustained fighting power requires sustained support. This
sustained support which gives real combat mobility to our Naval
forces is provided through the coordination of our Shore Establish
ment, Advanced and Floating Bases and our Mobile Logistic Support
Forces.

The use of the Task Force Type of Organization provides us
with great flexibility; therefore, forces can be constituted, assigned
missions and provided with adequate attached logistic support
merely by a simple dispatch.
We must never forget that the Fifth Fleet was able to fight
off Okinawa for 90 days supported entirely by the Mobile Logistic
Support Force, Service Squadron Six, and that it was this support
that made that sustained fighting power possible.
Summing up this greatly simplified discussion of basic Naval
logistics, let me re-state my structural formulation.
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Strategy and Tactics provide the scheme for the conduct of

military operations; Logistics provides the means therefor.

The means of war are Men, Materials and Services.

The

Fundamental Elements of Logistics are the Determination of Re
quirements, Procurement and Distribution.

The Basic Aspects are Organization, Planning, Execution

and Supervision.

In all cases these elements and aspects blend and

overlap in a manner and degree which varies according to circum
stances. When properly integrated with strategic and tactical con

siderations they combine to form a sound and harmonious structure
of flexible, mobile, and sustained fighting power.
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WHAT GOES ON HERE
An article by
S. Wild, Jr.

Payson

Americans, like most human beings, recoil at the thought of
war, and the idea of another war, a World War III, seems repulsive
beyond description. However, here and there in our country, there
are voices which are saying that we should engage in a so-called
"preventive war" against Russia. Some of these voices are scarcely
raised above a whisper, but the mere fact that a conflict against the
Soviets is being urged at all is of considerable significance. Be
cause this subject is so highly explosive, it might be argued that
it should be kept under cover, but in a democracy such as ours, ex
perience indicates that it is healthier to bring a discussion out into
the open where it can be appraised on its merits rather than to
treat it as something "hush-hush." Therefore, let's face up to the
issues involved, however unpalatable they may be, and let's bring
the problem out into the daylight where a more careful examina
tion is possible.

Why Some People Favor a "Preventive War"
The premise of those who favor our making war against the
Soviet Union in the near future is a very simple one, namely, that
war between the United States and Russia is inevitable anyway, so
why shouldn't we fight when the odds seem favorable to us? Pro
ponents of a "preventive war" on our part maintain that the Com
munists, and this includes the Soviet leaders, believe that a war to
· the finish between communism and capitalism must come some
time and that according to the philosophy of communism, the inProfessor Wild is Professor of Government and Dean of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University. This arti
cle is a reprint of Prof. Wild's article as it appeared in the June 1949
issue of Woman's Day. Prof. Wild served for many years as Associate
for International Law at the Naval War College.
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terests of a Communist state and those of a non-Communist power
are irreconcilable. Therefore, since peaceful coexistence between
Russia and the United States is impossible from the point of view
of the Kremlin itself, it behooves us, says the "preventive war"
school, to prepare now for the showdown and to attack when it suits
us and not the Communists.
Those who would have us launch the war first thus cite the
Communist texts on the inevitability of war between the rival ide
ologies and also the statements of Russian officials to the effect that
capitalism is an enemy which must be vanquished by force.

The

violent anti-American tone of the Russian press and radio, the war
like speeches of the high Soviet command and the constant stream
of denunciations of the West pouring from behind the Iron Curtain
all indicate, it is alleged, that the Soviet Union is convinced that the
"cold war" must get really "hot" in the future.

Analyzing Soviet

psychology and reasoning, "preventive war" supporters declare that
the basic strategy of communism never changes and that this
strategy is based on the assumption that capitalist nations and the
capitalist class must in time be liquidated by violence and war. That,
it is maintained, is the ultimate goal of Russian Communist thinking.
Furthermore, say such supporters, we should not be deceived
by day-to-day changes or modifications in Communist tactics. When
it seems advisable or convenient, the Russian government may talk
peace or make concessions and Stalin may utter soothing words or
agree to treaties which contain appealing phrases but all this, it is
asserted, is just a matter of expediency and temporary a�justment
which does not alter the hard core of Communist strategy built on
the doctrine of an ultimate war to the finish.
The Russians, therefore, will not hesitate to attack us, say
the "preventive war" people, when they feel that they are ready.
And when will they be ready? Here's where the atomic bomb comes
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into the argument. Back in 1945, just after Hiroshima, the scient
ists estimated that it would take the Russians from three to five

years to produce an atomic bomb of their own. Nearly four years
have passed since then and time is growing short, if the estimates

are correct.

Nowadays, some atomic experts say it may be 1952 or

1953 before the Russians can produce the bomb with any degree

of success, but what will happen when the American monopoly comes
to an end?

At that point, say those favoring a "preventive war,"

our present advantage stemming from our sole possession of the
bomb will be gone and we shall be at the mercy of the ruthless dis

ciples of Marx and his class-war school who will not hesitate to

obliterate our cities when they deem themselves ready.

Therefore, it is argued, why should we not attack fairly soon

before the Russians get the bomb and prevent them from waging

war on us at a later time? That's why there is talk of a

ventive war," a

"pre

war to forestall a later Soviet onslaught which, it is

declared, is bound to come at some point.

This argument is but

tressed by references to the Russian stand on the international con

trol of atomic energy in the United Nations. If, it is asked, the Soviet

Union genuinely desired peace, why didn't she subscribe to the plan

for placing all fissionable material under the direction of an inter

national agency, as proposed by the United States and all the non
Communist members of the United Nations, thus removing atomic

energy from the authority of any national government? Soviet op
position to international control and Soviet insistence on freedom

to manage atomic energy plants on her own, proves, it is claimed,

that Russia wants to stock-pile bombs for her own purposes, which
include a war against us when she thinks the time is ripe.

Believers in a "preventive war" go on to describe what they

think the situation will be like once the Russians acquire the bomb.
They predict that it will be a time of almost unbearable tension.

We shall be living in a war atmosphere, they say, with the threat of
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terrible destruction hanging over us. Because there seems to be
no adequate defense against an atomic bomb attack, the advantage
lies with the attacker who will endeavor to destroy or paralyze his
foe before the latter has a chance to retaliate or rally for a come
back. Unlik� 1917 or 1941, . we shall not have time, it is said, to
mobilize in a relatively leisurely fashion. To forestall the dreadful
consequences of being attacked in an atomic war, each side will be

under an almost overwhelming temptation to make a surprise at.;
tack first, it is declared, and with the Russians in possession of the
bomb, we shall be at the mercy of the Rusisan Communists unless
we destroy them first.
The logic of the "preventive war" school is thus clear: the
Communists will make war on us sometime, believing as they do
that such a war is inevitable, and are holding off until they acquire

the atomic bomb and find the moment auspicious for their purposes;
If that is the case, then why shouldn't we move up the time for the
war while we alone have the bomb and in the name of our own self.,.
defense strike while we have superiority instead of remaining pass
ive while they prepare to hit us at their convenience?
It is argued, however, that the United States, as a dem
ocracy with
Constitution which requires a vote in Congress be
fore we can legally make war, is not the kind of nation which can
wage a "preventive war," that is, a war in which we suddenly at
tack on our own initiative. To this the "preventive war'' people re
ply that (1) the President and the military establishment should

a

go ahead anyway and take quick military action without a delayed
build-up in public opinion and in Congress, explaining the reasons
later, and (2) the Russians are taking advantage of our good nature
and our democratic ways. They know, it is claimed, that despite
their belief in an inevitable armed clash, we are not the sort of
country which will unleash an unprovoked attack. Our very virtues
are our undoing, it is asserted; therefore, in dealing with a dictator-
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ship which can operate with speed and which can go to war without
consulting the people of Russia, we should, it is urged, be prepared
to move swiftly ourselves and thus surprise the Soviet rulers who
are counting on our hatred of war and our reluctance to attack
first as a means for allowing them to "blitz" us at a time of their
choosing.
What Opponents of a "Preventive War" Say

The arguments against the "preventive war" philosophy fall
into at least three main categories. One stresses the difficulties of a
"preventive war" purely from the military point of view, a second
challenges the assumption that war is inevitable and a third main
tains that military force by itself cannot eradicate the menace of
communism. Involved in the second and third arguments is really
a fourth, namely, the point of view of morality which questions
the right to bring on deliberately the horrors, death and destruction
of war on the grounds of a hypothesis, the hypothesis or assumption
that war is inevitable when that hypothesis cannot really be proved.
Taking up the military problem first, critics of the ''pre
ventive war" idea assert that its advocates seem to assume that
defeating Soviet Russia would involve merely tossing some atomic
bombs on Russian cities and that after that,the Soviet Union would
cry quits and sue for peace. The attitude that victory over Russia
could be gained in this fairly easy and relatively effortless fashion
is seriously questioned, however, by many experts, both military and
civilian, who have studied the problem. In the first place, these ex
perts say that Russia is so vast and the dispersion of industry and
resources is on such an enormous scale that atomic bombing of cer
tain cities would be insufficient for a knockout blow. Furthermore,
it is claimed, at the first sign of attack the Russian army would
sweep over Western Europe and ensconce itself in virtually every
corner of that continent. Would we then drop atomic bombs on Paris,
39
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Brussels, Rome and other cities inhabited by peoples friendly to us
in order to disrupt Russian military establishments?
be a tough question to decide.

That would

Above all, say the experts, the war could not be won by

bombs alone.

In the last analysis, it is troops which would have

to support air attack and carry the day by actually defeating the

armed forces of the enemy.

Therefore, so goes the argument,

we should have to be prepared to transport armies overseas, land

them in Europe, and smash the Soviet military machine in direct

combat.

In other words, if the Soviets occupied Europe, we would

have to have another "D-Day" all over again and would have to

challenge a powerful foe well entrenched behind the Atlantic sea
wall.

Even if resistance in the West prevented the Russians from

smashing immediately to the ocean, huge American reinforcements

would have to be ready for fighting in Europe. The experiences of
both Napoleon and Hitler in trying to conquer Russia are cited as

evidence of the extreme difficulty which might be encountered if
an attempt were made to invade Russia itself, a land which

stretches thousands of miles from Poland across Siberia to the
Pacific.

Then, say the "preventive war" opponents, suppose Russia

is vanquished, suppose that even air attacks brought about Soviet

peace overtures, we would still have to send a huge army of occupa

tion to insure Russian compliance with our peace terms.

Equipping

and maintaining the large armies needed both for war and for or

cupation would, it is claimed, strain the American economy to the
utmost.

Our way of life would be transformed; we would have to

become, state some experts, a military nation, with our manpower
and industry geared to the needs of a titanic military establishment.

Our relaxed, democratic ways, our production of civilian goods, our

peacetime pursuits would all disappear under the harsh necessity
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of supporting naval, ground and air forces capable of subduing a
powerful enemy and of holding him down afterward.
A "preventive war," therefore, is not something to be en
tered upon lightly. Those who have misgivings about such an en
terprise emphasize the tremendous problems involved and stress
what such a war would do to our democracy. They declare that a war
against Russia could not possibly be worth the carnage, devasta
tion and ruinous economic burdens entailed and suggest that it
would be such a disaster in so many ways that it should be thought
of only as a last resort when absolutely no other alternative giving
us a chance for survival seemed at hand.
Is War Inevitable?
Next, fault is found with the assumption that war with the
Soviet Union is inevitable. Those not in sympathy with the
"preventive war" point of view sometimes concede that war is pos
sible and that Communist ideology stresses the inevitability of a
showdown fight between communism and rival ideologies. They
may admit also that Russian behavior since 1945 has appeared to
be belligerent and non-cooperative. However, the opposition be
lieves that there is a chance, and not a slender one at that, that the
Soviet system can be halted without a war. It is pointed out that
the Kremlin leaders have pushed ahead whenever the going looked
easy, as in Eastern Europe, but that they have hesitated and acted
cautiously when confronted by formidable power. This line of
reasoning maintains that the Communist bosses are realists and,
unlike Hitler, are rational; that is, they will not go adventuring if
the odds look so great against them that they might lose. There
fore, it is contended that if the United States and like-minded na
tions build up a power coalition which out-balances the U. S. S. R.,
the Russians will be deterred from attacking, should they be so
minded, and will refrain from pressing matters to the breaking
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point. Furthermore, there are some who believe that the U. S. S. R.
has no aggressive designs whatsoever and that Russian moves
since 1945 have been primarily defensive anyway.
The concept of a power alignment offsetting Russian power
as a means of inducing the Soviets to refrain from warlike actions,
if they have any such intentions, underlies the whole American
policy of "containment" as expressed in the Truman doctrine, aid to
Greece and Turkey and the Atlantic Pact. The hope is that the prns
pect of being confronted by superior force will remove any tempta
tion on the part of the Communists to engage in an all-out war. Re-·
inforcing this view is the claim that the Communists themselves
are in no hurry, believing as they do that time is on their side and
that no exact timetable of conquest on Hitler's model is necessary,
and that if we can hold firm indefinitely, they can be contained in
definitely. Thus, in time, they will come to accept the fact, it is said,
that they must adjust to a situation in which a larger measure of
cooperation is the only alternative to a hopeless war. Isn't it
better, ask the "preventive war" critics, to proceed on these lines
and to take the chance of averting war in this fashion, than to pro
voke hostilities deliberately and bathe the world in blood on the
basis of an uproved assumption that such a holocaust must come
anyway?
What happens when the Russians get the bomb? Here
again the opponents of a "preventive war" admit that there will be
severe tension and considerable danger. But, it is said, we have
such a head start and will have so many more bombs available than
they at any given point, that they will not be assured of any easy
success should they decide to unleash a surprise attack. Provided
we disperse our atomic resources so that we could survive an initial
blow with considerable stores of bombs left for a counterattack,
the Russians would have to reckon with a retaliatory onslaught, the
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thought of which, it is asserted, ought to operate as a fairly ef
fective deterrent. Thus, if we build up power on our side, and pre
pare sensibly for a possible surprise blow against us, we should, it
is argued, be able to convince the Russians that war would be too
dangerous for them. In time, then, they would have to settle down
and recognize that the goal of world communism was impossible of
achievement without risks which would appear overwhelming.
Above all, say those opposed to a "preventive war," by avoiding
hysteria and provocative measur�s which could goad Russia into
belligerent countermoves and by keeping the diplomatic situation
fluid, with room for negotiation, we can, with careful leadership,
a1-rive at a stable relationship.

A "Preventive War" and Communism
A third major argument against a "preventive war" is that
even if it were successful in destroying Russian military power, it
would not eliminate communism. In fact, some declare, such an at
tack by us would stimulate its growth. The contention is that com
munism is an idea which appeals to people who are in distress and
who are dissatisfied with existing conditions, and which thrives on
disorder and chaos. Therefore, the claim is, unless we help to im
prove the lot of millions throughout the globe who see in communism
a chance to alter a state of affairs which they consider unsatisfac
tory, we shall not win them as converts to our cause.
Difficult as it is for us to realize, communism as an idea, it
is pointed out, has an appeal for the impoverished and the dis
possesssed who long to improve their status. The reality of com
munism in Russia and in the satellite states is one thing but to
people in Asia, Africa and the Near East who hear only the Com
munist promises of education, of more material goods, of medical
care and of "freedom" for the masses, the dream of communism
has a drawing power which, it is maintained, can be counteracted
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best by our showing that our way offers at least as much and a lot
more. Those who do not countenance the thought of a "preventiv�
war" insist, therefore, that a military conquest of Russia would not
eradicate the roots of communism which flourish in discontent and
misery. We would still, after victory, have to take care of the popula
tions who have proved susceptible to communist propaganda. And a

war, it is stated, would increase the unrest and reduce the standards

of living making more friends for communism than ever.

We and the Communists are struggling to capture men's
minds. Military means alone, say the foes of a "preventive war," do

not win out in this psychological struggle: you can't spread dem
ocracy by bayonets and machine guns. If we attacked Russia first,

wouldn't we, it is asked, play right into the hands of the Com
munists who would say, "See, we told you those capitalists were

warmongers who don't care about human welfare and who don't
shrink at wholesale slaughter"? How would we look to the rest
of the world?

Alternatives to War
Ideas and ideals have tremendous power in themselves, and

military force by itself is sterile, as Hitler's efforts to win con
quered populations by repression alone has shown.

Hence, say

those condemning a "preventive war," it is up to us to prove that
democracy is better and has more to offer materially and morally

than communism, and we can't do that solely by a display of armed
might.

Creating a defensive military alignment to hem in Soviet

expansionism may be a necessary step but, it is alleged, this is

largely a negative measure which mu�t be coupled with a positive

policy of outbidding the Communists in terms of benefits and ideo
logical appeal.

Communist ideology will be beaten, therefore, not

by force but by a better ideological and material offensive on our
part,

it

is claimed.
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At this point, "preventive war" opponents call attention to

the fact that we Americans are really revolutionaries in the modern
world.

ments.

Peoples everywhere have been stirred by our accomplish
They want what we have to offer and can produce.

Amer

ican movies and the gadgets such as cigarette lighters, wrist

watches, fountain pens and knives carried by our GI's to all corners

of the earth have, for example, created a demand for such items by

populations everywhere.

These peoples are not content with their

present material standards and are demanding and pressing for a
share of the wonders which the United States has on display.

The

United States has created a global ferment and the Communists in

many instances have capitalized on this unrest by promising to fill

such wants . But Soviet production is now unequal to the task. An

imaginative America, it is declared, can take the initiative from

communism by sharing our "know how" and turning our technical

skill in the direction of assisting others to participate more fully in

the benefits to be derived from our type of enterprise under demo

cratic auspices.

Instead of waging war to beat communism, it is argued that

we can come out on top, through skillful diplomacy and by adding a

program of economic and social welfare to our defensive military

arrangements.

In this fashion, say the exponents of this position,

we may avoid the horrors of war, and assume an unassailable type

· of leadership in world affairs which will win us firm friends and
pull the props out from Communist arguments.

To· attack Russia

first would mean, according to this thesis, that we would sacrifice

our moral hold on men's minds and would enable the Communists

to call us selfish imperialists bent on global supremacy for the sake

of profits and power.

In line with this argument, Mr. David E.

Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, said re

cently, "There are those among us who have been bewitched by

the atomic bomb........But it is important for us to recognize that
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neither the atomic bomb nor any form of power........constitutes the
true source of American strength........That source is our ethical and
moral standards of precepts and our democratic faith in man. This
faith is the chief armament of our democracy.

potent weapon ever devised."

It is the most
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